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CHAPTER 4 
Contracts 
J. EDWARD COLLINS 
§4.1. Impossibility of performance: Subcontractor's preliminary 
work. The status of a subcontractor whose contract has become im-
possible of performance because of the abandonment of the construc-
tion project covered by the prime contract has been a matter to which 
the attention of the Supreme Judicial Court has been directed with 
some frequency in recent years, following the judicial determination 
of the invalidity of a general contract for the building of a chronic 
disease hospital in Boston.1 In the first case of a trilogy, M. Ahern 
Co. v. John Bowen CO.,2 a subcontractor who was forced to discontinue 
performance under the contract when the project was stopped was 
held to have no enforceable contract rights against the prime con-
tractor, although he was entitled to quasi-contractual recovery for the 
value of the services, labor and materials furnished up to the time 
of the project's abandonment. The fact that the partial performance 
of the subcontractor had no value to the general contractor under the 
circumstances, and that any payment that the latter might be required 
to make would constitute an uncompensable loss to him, constituted 
no bar to the quasi-contractual recovery. In the second case, Boston 
Plate & Window Glass Co. v. John Bowen Co.,s recovery under a 
subcontract was sought for work done and expenses incurred in prepa-
ration for performance, the project having been stopped prior to the 
commencement of any actual performance. Recovery was denied, 
the Court leaving open the question whether quasi-contractual relief 
might be had in this situation. 
During the 1959 SURVEY year, the final case of the trilogy, Albre 
Marble and Tile Co. v. John Bowen Co.} came before the Court. 
J. EDWARD COLLINS is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law ScI;lOOI 
and faculty adviser of the Boston College Commercial and Industrial Law Review. 
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Bar Association of Hawaii and former acting dean of the Catholic University Law 
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§4.1. 1 Gifford v. Commissioner of Public Health, 328 Mass. 608, 105 N.E.2d 476 
(1952). 
2334 Mass. 36, 133 N.E.2d 484 (1956), discussed in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§4.1. 
3335 Mass. 697, 141 N.E.2d 715 (1957), discussed in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§14.2. 
4338 Mass. 394, 155 N.E.2d 437 (1959). 
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Here the subcontractor sought to recover both contractually and quasi-
contractually for expenditures incurred in the preparation of shop 
drawings, samples, affidavits and other work preliminary to the fur-
nishing of tile and marble material, services and labor in the con-
struction of the hospital. The invalidity of the prime contract had 
been adjudicated prior to the subcontractor's being called upon to 
install the tile and marble work. 
The case was disposed of in the trial court by order for judgment 
on the pleadings and affidavits submitted. The contractor's affidavit 
set up the facts and circumstances leading to the judicial declaration 
of invalidity of the prime contract. The subcontractor submitted a 
counteraffidavit seeking to avoid the defense of impossibility by claim-
ing that the contractor's wrongful acts caused the invalidity of the 
prime contract. The counteraffidavit was technically deficient and 
the order for judgment for the defendant on the contract counts was 
upheld by the Court. 
On the quasi-contract counts the defendant contended that the 
subcontractor's expenses were all incurred in preparation for perform-
ance and not in actual performance of the contract, and when con-
tractual performance becomes impossible only the value of labor and 
materials "wrought into" the structure is compensable.1i The plain-
tiff, on the other hand, claimed that under a contract clause he was 
required to submit the samples, shop drawings, tests and affidavits as 
they were ordered or specified by the contractor and they were pre-
pared under the contractor's supervision. 
The Court in agreeing that the subcontractor was entided to relief 
avoided approving any principle that would permit recovery for pay-
ments made or obligations incurred- in preparation for performance 
when contract performance has been rendered impossible through no 
fault of either party. Rather it based its decision upon a combina-
tion of three factors peculiar to this case. (1) The defendant's conduct, 
while not sufficiendy culpable to create liability for breach of contract, 
was a factor in creating the impossibility. (2) The subcontractor's 
preparatory expenses were not within his control but were required 
to be undertaken by the terms of the contract itself, when ordered 
or specified by the prime contractor. (3) The acts requested and per-
formed were incapable of being "wrought into" the structure. 
With the result of the case there can be no serious disagreement. 
The combination of factors pointed out by the Court certainly justifies 
its conclusion. The case is disappointing, however, since it fails to 
give much needed clarification to the Massachusetts law of quasi-
Ii Young v. Chicopee, 186 Mass. 518, 72 N.E. 611 (1904), involved a contract to 
repair a municipal bridge, the contractor to be paid on a unit basis for each 
thousand feet of lumber wrought into the bridge. Upon destruction of the bridge 
by fire before the job was completed, the contractor was permitted to recover only 
for the lumber "wrought into" it and not for the unused lumber stacked on the 
bridge and its approaches. Title to the unused lumber was in the contractor and 
it was his loss, whereas that "wrought into" the bridge became the property of the 
town for which it was liable to pay. 
______________________________________ "",J.,' 
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contracts. The so-called "wrought into" principle, as enunciated in 
Young v. Chicopee,6 denies recovery for work done pursuant to a con-
tract rendered impossible of performance by the destruction, without 
fault of either party, of the structure into which the work is designed 
to be incorporated, prior to the incorporation of the work into the 
structure. The principle is of doubtful validity and it is unfortunate 
that the Court saw fit to distinguish the Young case rather than repudi-
ate the principle or narrowly limit its applicability to property loss 
si tuations. 'I' 
The case is likewise disappointing in that it contains no suggestion 
as to whether either of the two other factors considered by the Court, 
i.e., the culpability of the contractor or the contractual obligation of 
the subcontractor to undertake the preparatory work under the super-
vision of the contractor, would standing alone constitute a sufficient 
basis for the granting of quasi-contractual relief. 
In the Ahern case the Court clearly pointed out that, since the 
contractor's conduct played a significant part in causing the situation 
that resulted in the impossibility of the subcontractor's completely 
performing, the contractor should pay the contract price.s Since the 
Albre case involved work normally characterized as preparatory to 
contract performance, but which was actually required by specific 
contract language to be undertaken when requested by the contractor 
and so was under his supervision, it could be urged that Albre does 
not go beyond Ahern but is actually another partial performance 
case for which contractual relief should have been available. On the 
other hand it remains to be seen whether the Albre case would be 
followed in a situation in which the contractor was instrumental in 
causing the impossibility, and the work done by the subcontractor 
was purely preparatory and not specifically required by the contract 
although nevertheless essential to the subcontractor's contemplated 
performance. It certainly could be contended that the expense in-
curred should properly have been a cost item in the subcontractor's 
bid for the job, and that he had reasonably expected to be paid for 
it out of the contract price. It would appear that payment for such 
expenses would be legally justifiable under such circumstances on a 
6 186 Mass. 518, 72 N.E. 63 (1904), discussed in note 5 supra. 
'/' A more appropriate test would be whether the preparatory work was necessary 
for the performance specified under the contract and was a cost item reasonably 
to be included as a factor in the make-up of the contract price. The Comment to 
2 Restatement of Contracts §468(3) states that, when there is fault on neither side, 
loss due to impossibility must lie where it falls except that the recipient of the bene-
fit of performance must pay to the "extent that what he has received forwards 
the object of the contract." Section 333 would permit recovery of compensatory 
damages in breach of contract actions for expenditures in necessary preparation for 
performance when they can be fairly regarded as a part of the cost of performance 
in estimating profit and loss. The subcontractor's expenditures in the Albre case 
were of this type. 
S Section 468 of the Restatement of Contracts gives a right of restitution to a 
party who has rendered part performance under a contract, full performance having 
become impossible. See also §333. discussed in note 7. 
3
Collins: Chapter 4: Contracts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1959
48 1959 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSA~HUSE'ITS LAW §4.2 
quasi-contractual basis. It is unfortunate that the Court makes no 
intimation to that effect. 
§4.2. Architect's approval: Power to decide. It has become cus-
tomary in construction contracts to provide that the architect, Or 
engineer shall have power to direct the construction work and resolve 
questions that may arise in the course of it. Contract stipulations to 
that effect have been approved by the courts although cases have not 
been infrequent in which parties have challenged the powers of the 
architect thereunder or the propriety of his decisions. Two such cases 
arose during the 1959 SURVEY year. 
In G. L. Ruga b Sons, Inc. v. Town of Lexington1 the question was 
presented as to the remedies that might be available to a contractor 
when the architect decides that certain work is required by the speci-
fications, which work the contractor claims to be an "extra" for which 
he should be paid. The contract provided that the architect should 
"decide all questions which may arise as to the interpretation of the 
plans and specifications and as to the fulfillment of the contract on 
the part of the contractor, and his determination shall be final and 
conclusive." 2 When the question arose, the architect determined that 
strapping of the ceilings of some rooms was required under the contract. 
The contractor made the installation but, believing the determination 
to have been erroneous, submitted the question to arbitration under 
another contract clause that provided for arbitration of arbitrable 
issues. A majority of the arbitration panel agreed with the contractor 
that the installation was an extra, but denied his claim for payment 
on the ground that the architect's decision was final under the con-
tract. The Court agreed with this determination, holding that under 
the contract the arbitrators were empowerd only to determine whether 
the architect had acted beyond his powers or was guilty of fraud or 
bad faith in making his decision.s 
This conclusion represents no departure from prior case law in 
Massachusetts and is consistent with the law elsewhere.· The case is 
of interest, however, from the viewpoint of contract draftsmanship, 
particularly since the arbitration clause specifically provided that the 
arbitrators should, at the request of either party, refer "any question 
of law to the proper court," and in the event of any discrepancy be-
tween the arbitration clause and any other provisions of the contract 
the arbitration clause should govern. Since the arbitration machinery 
was ineffective in this instance to provide a review of the architect's 
§4.2. 1888 Mass. 746, 157 N.E.2d 521 (1959). 
2888 Mass. at 748,157 N.E.2d at 528. 
S An additional possibility that the architect may have made a decision so com-
pletely erroneous as to have in effect substituted a new contract for that made by 
the parties was not considered by the Court or the arbitrators. See Benjamin 
Foster Co. v. Commonwealth, 818 Mass. 190, 61 N.E.2d 147 (1945); Morgan v. Town 
of Burlington, 816 Mass. 4U, 55 N.E.2d 758 (1944). 
4 Hurley v. City of Boston, 244 Mass. 466, 188 N.E. 888 (1928); Shine v. Hage-
meister Realty Co., 169 Wis. 848, 112 N.W. 750 (1919). See Spencer, Powers of Direc-
tion aDd Determination Under Construction Contracts, 41 Va. L. Rev. !l4!l (1955). 
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determination, if such a review is desired by the contracting parties, 
then the contract should so provide by more specific terms, preferably 
by appropriate language in the clause setting out the architect's 
powers.5 Any provision for such a right of review, however, would 
be contrary to the general philosophy of these stipulations which are 
designed to provide a speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes 
connected with the job.6 
In Fred C. McLean Heating Supplies, Inc. v. Jefferson Construction 
CO.,7 the principal question presented was whether an architect was 
empowered to settle a dispute between the prime contractor and a 
subcontractor, which dispute was not presented to the architect until 
after the project had been accepted by the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts. The contract clause provided that the architect should 
decide all questions as to the interpretation of the plans and specifi-
cations and as to the fulfillment of the contract on the part of the con-
tractor. His decision was to be final. This clause was incorporated 
by reference into the subcontract. The subcontractor installed the 
heating system as required but made no arrangements for its opera-
tion. The contractor then operated it for some five months and billed 
the subcontractor for the fuel consumed as well as for the labor re-
quired for its operation. Some two months after the building was 
accepted, the architect in a letter to the contractor interpreted the 
specifications to require the subcontractor to provide the heating. 
The master to whom the case was referred found the architect acted 
in good faith in making his determination, and his report was adverse 
to the subcontractor. The trial court sustained exceptions to the 
master's report, and this was affirmed on appeal. 
The reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court was that the purpose 
of the clause giving the architect the power to resolve disputes arising 
in connection with the drawings and specifications is to permit the 
continuance of the work with a minimum of interruption.. This is 
evident from the language of previous cases that makes reference to 
the architect's exercise of control over the work "as it progresses." 8 
Therefore, this power is not to be construed as extending beyond the 
completion of the work, except in limited instances specified by ap-
propriate language in the stipulation.9 
This conclusion is undoubtedly correct as far as it goes, but it is 
doubtful if this is the only purpose in the minds of the parties when 
they insert such a stipulation in their contract. When a contractor 
53 Corbin, Contracts §652 (1951); Parker and Adams, The A.I.A. Standard Con· 
tract Forms and the Law 55, art. 39 (1954). 
6 Annotation, 137 A.L.R. 530 (1942). 
7 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 961, 159 N.E.2d 95. 
8 Benjamin Foster Co. v. Commonwealth, 318 Mass. 190, 61 N.E.2d 147 (1945). In 
Handy v. Bliss, 204 Mass. 513, 520, 90 N.E. 864, 865 (1910), the expression used is 
"in the exercise of the work." See also Derby Desk Co. v. Connors Bros. Construc-
tion Co., 204 Mass. 461, 467, 468, 90 N.E. 543, 544 (1910). 
9 These provisions deal principally with repairs or replacements required to be 
made fur a period of a year after project acceptance. 
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agrees to be bound by a decision of an architect from which there is 
no right of appeal, irrespective of its soundness, absent abuse of power 
or fraud, is he not in fact indicating a willingness to pay the price 
of an honest but erroneous and costly architect's decision in order to 
avoid the necessity of having all job disputes resolved by the more 
costly and less expeditious method of court action? 10 While pre· 
sumably either the contractor or the subcontractor in the present case 
could have submitted the question to the architect in sufficient time 
to have the issue resolved prior to the acceptance of the project, it 
is not inconceivable that under other circumstances the disputant 
could withhold from the other party notification of the issue to be 
resolved, informally sound out the architect to get his reaction to the 
problem, and in the event that it appeared adverse to his contention, 
postpone the raising of the issue until a date that would preclude 
decision by the architect prior to acceptance of the project. The 
opinion leaves open the question of the effect of the project acceptance 
upon the power of the architect to resolve pending disputes. Whether 
appropriate contract language could eliminate the problem of post-
acceptance submissions, as well as of those unresolved at acceptance, 
is undecided, although the general sense of the opinion would appear 
to permit such a possibility. 
§4.3. Unilateral contracts: Broker's commission. One of the more 
troublesome problems in the law of contracts is concerned with the 
rights and obligations of parties to a contract transaction that is uni-
lateral in nature, prior to the completion of the desired performance. 
The issue is most frequently raised when the offeror seeks to withdraw 
after the offeree has commenced but not completed the requested 
act. The Restatement of Contracts in this case would hold the offeror 
bound upon tender of part of the requested consideration, and even 
prior thereto upon the offeree's undertaking preparation or perform-
ance under circumstances in which fairness would require enforcement 
of the promise.1 The problem is frequently posed in brokerage situ-
ations with their overtones of agency law. 
In Malloy v. Coldwater Seafood Corp.,2 the broker was employed 
under a contract terminable by the principal without notice. It was 
provided that a 5 per cent commission would be payable on direct 
sales of the principal's products in the New England area. At the 
time the major product sold was trade-marked fish fillets. Shortly 
after the contract was entered into, the industry became interested in 
10 Parker and Adams, The A.I.A. Standard Contract Forms and the Law 57, art. 
39 (1954). 
§4.3. 1 Section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts states that when an offer for 
a unilateral contract is made and part of the performance tendered, the offeror is 
contractually bound during a reasonable time within which the offeree may corn· 
plete his performance. Section 90' states that a promise reasonably expected to, and 
which does, induce action of a substantial character is binding when injustice 
would otherwise result. See I Corbin, Contracts §63 (1951); I Williston, Contracts 
§60A (3d ed. 1957). 
2338 Mass. 554, 156 N.E.2d 61 (1959). 
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the possible use of blocks of codfish for processing into frozen fish 
sticks. The broker actively solicited large industrial fish processors 
for some ten months, and made a few sample sales. The broker's 
activities and progress were periodically reported to the principal. 
After having secured a 40,000-pound order, for which the commission 
was paid, and while in the process of closing orders for some additional 
270,000 pounds, the parties made a contract which excluded commis-
sions on industrial sales to the five largest processors with whom the 
broker had been negotiating and from whom substantial orders were 
subsequently received. In addition the commission rate on all other 
industrial sales in amounts over 100,000 pounds was reduced. Three 
months later the principal terminated· the contract as so modified. 
The broker sought to recover commissions on all sales made up to the 
time of termination and on sales that occurred after his discharge but 
largely as a result of his efforts. The evidence clearly showed that 
when the contract was modified the principal realized that the indus-
trial demand for its products was so great that the services of a broker 
were unnecessary. It could also be inferred that the principal desired 
to avoid paying commissions on business it could obtain anyway with-
out the services of a broker. 
The trial judge instructed the jury that if the principal's motive 
in the cancellation of the contract was to deprive the broker of com-
missions he would otherwise have received, this would be evidence 
of bad faith, and the principal would, consequently, be liable for 
the commissions even though the broker might not have been the 
efficient cause of the sales. Conversely the rule was stated to be, that 
if the principal 
acted in good faith, not seeking to escape the payment of com-
missions but motivated fairly by a view of its own interests, it had 
the absolute right before a bargain was made and while negotia-
tions remained unsuccessful, before commissions were earned, to 
revoke the plaintiff's authority and the plaintiff cannot thereafter 
claim compensation for a sale made by the defendant even though 
it be to a customer with whom the plaintiff unsuccessfully nego-
tiated and even though to some extent the defendant might justly 
be said to have availed itself of the fruits of the plaintiff's labor.3 
This instruction was approved by the Supreme Judicial Court as a 
proper statement of applicable law in the light of an imposing list of 
Massachusetts decisions. 
The effect of this rule is to penalize the broker when the revocation 
is made in good faith. That this rule happens to work well in a situa-
tion such as the present case does not eliminate its weaknesses. A 
principal could revoke in good faith in a case in which the broker 
has expended considerable time and money in either preparing for 
performance or in partially performing. Under the Massachusetts 
333S Mass. at 563, 156 N .E.2d at 66-67. 
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rule the broker would be remediless, despite the fact that the prin-
cipal-offeror might ultimately if not immediately be the beneficiary 
of his very substantial and valuable activity. To permit the principal 
to be free of any obligation to make payment, at least to the extent of 
benefits received, merely because his heart was pure when he revoked 
the offer by termination of the relationship, brings about a result 
neither technically nor equitably satisfactory. The offeree's position 
is particularly unenviable because of the demonstrated reluctance of 
the Massachusetts courts to grant quasi-contractual relief for expendi-
tures incurred in preparation for performance of a contract made 
impossible of fulfillment for reasons other than the fault of the oppo-
site party.4 
Though less striking in its inequity, the rule does bring about the 
result that a broker whose contract has been canceled in bad faith 
by his principal may recover full commissions on sales on which he 
has done work, although his work was concededly not the efficient 
cause of the sales. While presumably his contribution would have to 
have been substantial, it is not at all impossible that he would receive 
a windfall justifiable only as a penalty exacted from the principal 
who has attempted, by his cancellation, to avoid paying the broker 
any commissions at all. 
This entire problem should be thoroughly reconsidered by the 
Court. Other jurisdictions have held that, when the broker has been 
given an exclusive agency and has in a bona fide manner entered upon 
performance and expended time and money thereon, the offer to pay 
commissions for sales secured becomes irrevocable for a reasonable 
time within which the broker may attempt to close the transactions.5 
This appears to be a much more logical approach to the problem and 
one assuring a result not only more equitable but more in consonance 
with the actual intention of the parties when they enter into such a 
broker-principal relationship. 
4 See the discussion of this point in §4.l supra. 
5 For a compilation of cases, see 1 Williston, Contracts §60A, n.6 (3d ed. 1957). 
See also 1 Corbin, Contracts §50 (1951). 
________________________________________ i
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